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Introduction	
	
In	 the	 financial	 accounts	 as	 collected	 by	 the	U.S.	 Federal	 Reserve,	 one	Balance	
Sheet	 item	 stands	 out:	 “The	 Household	 Balance	 Sheet	 over	 the	 period	 2000-
2020”.	 In	 Q4	 2005,	 the	 market	 value	 of	 households’	 real	 estate	 assets	 was	
$14.416	trillion.	By	Q4	2011	the	market	value	had	dropped	to	$8.319	trillion:	a	
loss	of	$6.1	trillion	over	five	years	or	a	loss	of	42.2%	over	the	same	period.	For	
all	households	it	took	to	Q2	2016	before	the	loss	had	been	recovered	when	the	
market	value	reached	$14.488	trillion.	This	reflects	an	adjustment	period	of	over	
10	years!	
	
The	U.S.	Federal	government	tax	receipts	over	the	three-year	period	2009,	2010	
and	2011	 totaled	 	 $6.573	 trillion.	Even	 the	government	borrowings	over	 these	
three	years	 together	amounted	 to	a	 smaller	 sum	of	$4.169	 trillion.	The	 loss	on	
households’	real	estate	between	Q4	2005	and	Q4	2011	was	equal	to	93%	of	all	
U.S.	government	tax	receipts,	not	just	for	one	year,	but	over	three	years!	
	
Whilst	 the	Great	Recession	of	2008-2012	wreaked	havoc	with	U.S.	government	
budgets,	but	more	important	was	the	damage	inflicted	on	households’	economies	
over	these	years	and	beyond.	
	
To	 counter	 the	 2008	 recession,	 two	 of	 the	 instruments	 used	 were	 the	
Quantitative	 Easing	 	 (“Q.E.”)	 program	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	 the	 deficit	
financing	by	 the	U.S.	Federal	Government.	The	Q.E.	program	focused	on	buying	
up	 U.S.	 government	 debt	 and	mortgage-backed	 securities	 paper	 issued	 by	 the	
state	 sponsored	 financial	 institutions,	 such	 as	 Fannie	 Mae	 and	 Freddy	 Mac.	
Interest	rates	were	kept	at	historical	lows.	The	U.S.	government	debt	to	GDP	level	
did	 rise	 from	 62%	 in	 2007	 to	 135.6%	 of	 GDP	 as	 per	 Q2	 2020.The	 four	 Q.E.	
programs	have	pumped	in	just	over	$6	trillion	into	the	U.S.	economy	as	per	the	
latest	figures.	
		
The	current	coronavirus	crisis	can	be	expected	to	bring	with	it	a	substantial	rise	
in	unemployment	levels,	significant	company	failures	and	a	greater	reluctance	by	
banks	to	lend	to	those	most	in	need.	
	
Further	increasing	U.S.	government	debt	levels	might	not	be	an	attractive	option.	
More	Q.E.	directed	to	funding	existing	debt	levels	also	has	its	limits.	One	solution	
that	 has	 not	 been	 tried	 is	 to	 use	 Q.E.	 to	 help	 households	 directly	 in	 releasing	
some	 home	 equity	 on	 a	 temporary	 basis.	 Funding	 savings	 rather	 than	 debts	
could	be	more	effective.	
	
A	new	type	of	Q.E.	will	be	set	out	in	this	paper.	
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1.	The	downward	slope	
	
Over	 the	 years	 2006-2020,	 the	 U.S.	 government	 has	 seen	 its	 debt	 levels	 grow	
from	 62%	 of	 GDP	 in	 2007	 to	 135.6%	 of	 GDP	 as	 per	 Q2	 2020.1	The	 main	
acceleration	came	 in	2020	due	to	 the	coronavirus	crisis.	The	U.S.	government’s	
current	starting	point	to	help	out	households	to	overcome	the	drop	 in	 incomes	
and	in	jobs	is,	at	best,	a	very	difficult	one.	More	government	debt	can	always	be	
incurred;	 however	will	 it	 be	 extensive	 and	 timely	 enough?	More	Q.E.	might	 be	
another	option,	but	will	it	be	able	to	help	those	who	most	need	it:	those	on		lower	
incomes,	 the	unemployed	youth	and	 the	people	 struggling	 to	pay	 their	bills	on	
time?	
	
The	Federal	Reserve	has	also	taken	major	steps	with	its	four	Q.E.	programs	that	
in	total	have	increased	its	exposure	from	$905.3	billion	on	September	1,	2008	to	
$7.157	trillion	on	November	9	2020.2		With	this	latest	increase,	what	is	the	future	
for	further	Q.E.	action?	
	
The	current	coronavirus	crisis	has	affected	many	households	in	the	U.S.	as	well	
as	 in	 other	 countries.	 The	 testing	 stage	 of	 new	 vaccines	 seems	 to	 have	 been	
successful,	 but	 the	 immediate	 negative	 effects	 of	 the	 corona	 crisis	 will,	 most	
likely,	 continue	 for	 another	 six	 to	 twelve	 months.	 What	 this	 means	 is	 that	
employment	levels	will	only	slowly	increase;	more	household	bankruptcies	will	
occur	and	more	companies	will	go	under.	Under	these	circumstances	the	banking	
sector	will	be	reducing	its	lending	levels,	including	for	mortgage	loans.	
	
The	 one	 aspect	 that	 often	 seems	 to	 be	 taken	 for	 granted	 is	 the	 savings	 level	
accumulated	 by	 individual	 households,	 both	 in	 home	 equity	 and	 in	 pension	
savings.	 By	 2019,	 U.S.	 citizens	 had	 collectively	 accumulated	 $32.3	 trillion	 in	
pension	savings	plus	a	further	net	$19.656	trillion	in	home	equity.	On	top	of	this	
there	are	bank	deposits	and	individual	shareholdings	that	will	increase	this	level	
even	further.	
	
The	 corona	 crisis	has	had	and	will	have	a	major	 financial	 impact	on	many	U.S.	
households	that	can	least	afford	it:	the	bottom	50%	of	households.	To	show	how	
long	 the	 financial	 crisis	 previously	 impacted	 this	 group,	 one	 may	 refer	 to	 the	
Federal	 Reserve’s	 statistics3 ,	 which	 indicate	 that	 these	 households	 had	 an	
accumulated	net	worth	of	$1.453	trillion	in	Q1	2007.	They	experienced	a	drop	to	
$180.7	 billion	 in	 Q2	 2011:	 a	 loss	 of	 85%!	 	 The	 bottom	 50%	 finally	 saw	 their	
wealth	 level	 restored	 to	 the	Q1	2007	 level	by	Q1	2018	when	 for	 the	 first	 time	
since	2007	it	reached	a	level	of	$1.571	trillion;	just	above	the	Q1	2007	level.	This	
represents	an	adjustment	period	of	11	years;	only	to	reach	the	level	achieved	by	
Q1	2007.		
																																																								
1	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEGDQ188S	
2	https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm	
3	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WFRBLB50107	
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One	 may	 describe	 this	 as	 a	 very	 disappointing	 adjustment	 period	 and	 a	
disastrous	one	for	the	bottom	50%	of	U.S.	households.	
	
	
1.1	Is	there	a	way	to	turn	the	downward	slope	into	an	upward	one?	
	
In	 hindsight,	 the	 Great	 Recession	 experience	 of	 2006-2012	 did	 show	 that	
allowing	 the	 property	 markets	 sorts	 itself	 out	 did	 not	 work.	 In	 a	 highly	
interesting	 set	 of	 statistics	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,4	it	 shows	 the	 real	 estate	
wealth	 by	 percentage	 group	 based	 on	 income	 levels.	 Some	 of	 the	 data	 are	 as	
follows:	
	
2006	Q4																																														2012	Q1																																					2020	Q2	
																									$	Trillion																			$	Trillion																																			$	Trillion	
		
Bottom	50%								3.43																						2.63		(change	-23.3%)												3.62	(+37.6%)	
	
50-90%															10.69																					7.34		(change	-31.3%)											13.34	(+81.7%)	
	
90-100%													10.03																					7.96	(change	-20.6%)												13.89	(+74.5%)	
	
It	is	easy	to	notice	that	the	recovery	rate	for	the	bottom	50%	of	income	earners	
was	much	lower	than	for	the	top	50%	of	other	households.	
	
One	main	reason	was,	and	is,	linked	to	households’	income	and	savings	levels.		
	
The	 Great	 Recession	 was	 preceded	 by	 the	 practice	 of	 putting	 all	 different	
qualities	 of	 mortgages	 together	 into	 mortgage-backed	 securities.	 This	 led	 to	
failures	to	understand	the	real	risk	 levels	 in	such	securities.	The	second	failure	
was	that	the	split	and	slice	practice	of	home	mortgages	broke	the	link	between	
the	households	and	the	funding	providers.	U.S.	banks	sold	their	mortgage	risks	to	
third	parties,	 but	 the	ultimate	 fund	providers	 relied	on	 the	 competence	of	U.S.	
banks	 to	 distinguish	 between	 acceptable	 and	 unacceptable	 risks.	 Quite	 a	 few	
banks	 jumped	 onto	 the	 bandwagon,	 only	 to	 show	 later	 on	 that	 they	 had	
misjudged	the	risks.	
	
In	2007,	 this	securitization	process	came	 to	an	end	when	BNP	Paribas	decided	
that	liquidity	in	its	U.S.	mortgage	backed	security	funds	had	evaporated.	
	
																																																								
4		
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/#qu
:123;series:Real%20estate;demographic:networth;population:1,3,5,7;units:level
s;quarter:123			
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What	happened	from	2007,	can	best	be	shown	in	the	next	table. If	2006	is	used	
as	a	base	year	and	the	1,215,304	Foreclosure	Filings	in	that	year	are	equivalent	
to	100	then	the	subsequent	years	rank	as	follows:		
																																				
Year																						Foreclosure	filings:		
																																				
2006																					100.0			
2007																					181.3		
2008																					248.5		
2009																					284.5		
2010																					316.3		
2011																					322.6		
2012																					189.9		
2013																					112.7	
	
In	 2007,	 short	 term	 teaser	 interest	 rates	 -mostly	 used	 by	 the	 lower	 income	
groups-	came	to	an	end	and	hefty	increases	in	home	mortgage	payments	needed	
to	be	made.		Lower	income	families	were	classified	with	an	income	from	$15.286	
per	annum	for	the	bottom	20%;	$	40.652	for	the	20-40%	group	and	$68.938	for	
40-60%	group	according	to	the	U.S.	Census	Bureau.	
	
Many	of	 the	 lower	 income	families	got	 into	serious	 financial	 trouble	during	the	
period	2007-2013	as	the	above	foreclosure	filings	clearly	illustrate.	The	top	50%	
of	 income	 earners	 usually	 had	 other	 savings	 to	 fall	 back	 on	 to	 stave	 off	
repossession	of	their	properties.	
	
With	a	high	degree	of	 certainty,	one	may	conclude	 that	 the	bottom	50%	of	 the	
U.S.	 households	 were	 hardest	 hit	 during	 the	 Great	 Recession,	 even	 those	 who	
were	renting	rather	than	being	homeowners.	How	uneven	the	home	ownership	
was	among	the	three	income	groups	can	be	seen	by	the	percentage	of	wealth	by	
each	group.	The	bottom	50%	of	households	owned	14.2%	of	home	equity.	The	
50-90%	 of	 households	 owned	 44.3%	 of	 home	 equity	 and	 the	 top	 10%	 owned	
41.5%	of	such	equity.	
	
2.	The	limits	to	funding	debt	levels.	
	
The	current	coronavirus	pandemic	is	a	clear	example	that	government	debts	can	
and	do	increase	rapidly.	It	is	like	a	repeat	of	the	Great	Recession	period;	with	the	
difference	that	at	the	start	or	the	Great	Recession	in	2007,	the	Government	debt	
to	 GDP	 level	 was	 63%	 of	 GDP.	 It	 did	 reach	 135.6%	 as	 per	 Q2	 2020.	 As	 a	
consequence	 of	 this	 debt	 increase,	 the	 annual	 interest	 costs	 have	 also	 grown	
substantially	notwithstanding	the	lowering	of	interest	rates.	
	
What	are	the	choices?	
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Never	during	the	20th	or	21rd	century	have	U.S.	government	debt	levels	exceeded	
the	 136%	 of	 GDP	 that	 was	 reached	 by	 Q2	 2020.	 Government	 debt	 represents	
expenditure	 that	 was	 not	 funded	 by	 taxes.	 Any	 government	 of	 any	 political	
leaning	 can	 use	 borrowings	 to	 expand	 its	 activities	 in	 a	 current	 year	 over	 and	
above	its	tax	revenues.	Such	borrowings	have	two	aspects:	the	first	one	is	that	it	
is	 an	 additional	 expense	 that	 usually	 creates	 economic	 activities:	 a	 gain	 for	
households.	 However	 the	 gain	 turns	 into	 a	 loss	 to	 households	 when	 in	 future	
years	a	government	tries	to	reduce	its	outstanding	debt	by	increasing	tax	levels.	
	
The	same	reasoning	applies	to	Q.E.	activities.	Q.E.	buys	up	debt	based	on	creating	
the	 money	 needed.	 In	 the	 U.S.	 this	 method	 did	 not	 exist	 till	 2009	 when	 the	
Federal	 Reserve	 started	 it.	 Q.E.	 has	 now	been	 used	 for	 an	 amount	 of	 about	 $6	
trillion.	Again	the	way	back	would	be	to	sell	off	such	holdings	to	the	open	market,	
if	demand	would	be	there.	
	
One	could	argue	that	the	limits	to	U.S.	government	borrowings	are	approaching,	
not	 because	 financial	 markets	 are	 unwilling	 to	 lend	 more,	 but	 because	 the	
reverse	action	of	lowering	government	debt	levels	will	need	to	be	too	draconian	
on	households.	For	QE	there	is	a	different	reason.	Q.E.	does	not	necessarily	need	
to	stop,	but	 there	can	be	a	different	 type	of	Q.E.	 that	 focuses	on	savings	rather	
than	on	debts.	
	
	
3.	A	new	use	of	Q.E.?	
	
It	is	obvious	that	both	U.S.	government	borrowing	and	the	current	method	of	Q.E.	
did	use	debts	as	the	key	ingredient	to	help	stimulate	the	U.S.	economy.		
	
Is,	in	the	current	circumstances,	a	further	increase	in	government	debt	levels	and	
an	additional	QE	expansion	really	the	best	way	to	overcome	a	financial	crisis?	
	
Home	 equity	 represents	 savings	 levels.	 The	 recovery	 of	 mortgage	 debts	 by	 a	
banking	system	that	was	itself	responsible	for	its	own	lending	practices,	showed	
that	this	adjustment	was	-economically	speaking-	highly	inefficient.	It	caused	the	
recovery	period	to	take	11	years	in	order	to	get	back	to	the	home	equity	savings	
levels	of	2007.		
	
What	was	and	is	now	again	needed	is	to	restart	the	economy	in	order	to	create	a	
higher	 level	of	disposable	 incomes.	Rather	 than	borrowings,	 the	 focus	could	be	
on	home	equity	 savings	 levels.	The	U.S.	Treasury	did	expand	 its	 activities	with	
the	help	of	government	debt	increases.	However	the	U.S.	Treasury	was	fighting	a	
losing	 battle,	 as	 the	 savings	 losses	 were	 equivalent	 to	 nearly	 three	 years	 of	
Federal	 government	 tax	 revenues.	 The	 revenues	 flow	 was	 outflanked	 by	 the	
savings	losses	in	a	major	way.	Keynesian	methods	did	no	longer	work.	
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The	allocation	of	Q.E.	by	the	Federal	Reserve	was	aimed	at	funding	outstanding	
debts	 by	 the	 U.S.	 government	 and	 by	 debts	 issued	 by	 the	 State	 sponsored	
mortgage	institutions.	Both	were	debt	related.	
	
There	can	be	a	different	approach,	especially	for	Q.E.	The	aim	of	it	is	exactly	the	
same	as	 in	all	 economic	 interventions:	Stimulate	economic	growth	 levels	when	
market	forces	pull	an	economy	in	the	opposite	direction.	
	
The	main	 economic	 experience	 of	 the	 Great	 Recession	was	 that	 the	 combined	
powers	of	the	U.S.	government	and	that	of	the	Federal	Reserve	were	insufficient	
to	offset	the	savings	losses	in	home	equity	suffered	by	nearly	all	homeowners.		
	
The	banking	sector	did	not	help	as	it	was	in	their	interests	to	avoid	losses.	Banks	
reduced	 lending	 levels	 and	 as	 the	 foreclosure	 statistics	 showed,	 they	 used	
foreclosure	methods	extensively	over	the	period	2007-2013.	The	banking	sector	
added	to	the	household	losses	by	generally	pursuing	those	who	could	no	longer	
afford	 the	mortgage	payments.	 It	 also	 caused	new	housing	 starts	 to	drop	 from	
the	near	highest	 level	 in	2005,	when	2.068	million	new	homes	were	started	 in	
that	year.		In	2009	the	bottom	was	reached	with	only	554	thousand	new	housing	
starts.	Even	by	2019	“only”	1.290	million	new	homes	were	started5.	
	
The	 key	 to	 understand	what	 could	 have	 been	 done	 is	 to	 consider	 what	 home	
equity	stands	for.	Home	equity	is	basically	a	savings	product	built	up	over	many	
years.	In	this	manner	it	is	more	or	less	like	pension	savings.		
	
Every	 household	 needs	 a	 place	 to	 live	 in,	 either	 owned	 by	 the	 household	 or	
rented	from	other	households.	
	
Very	few	households	are	lucky	enough	to	have	inherited	enough	wealth	to	buy	a	
property	outright.	Nearly	all	have	 to	save	over	a	period,	often	 lasting	30	years.	
What	 happened	 during	 the	 Great	 Recession	 was	 that	 such	 savings	 flow	 was	
interrupted	 by	 the	 banking	 sector.	 Debts	 drove	 out	 equity	 stakes!	 The	 bottom	
50%	 of	 households	 suffered	 the	most	 for	 the	 simple	 reason	 that	 they	 did	 not	
have	 enough	 spare	 cash	 in	 savings	 to	 continue	 the	mortgage	payments.	As	 the	
data	 in	 footnote	3	show,	 the	net	worth	of	all	households	 in	 the	bottom	50%	of	
incomes	stood	at	$1.454	trillion	 in	Q1	2007	and	by	Q2	2011	 it	had	dropped	to	
$189.7	 billion;	 a	 loss	 of	 87.6%	 or	 $1.26	 trillion.	 According	 to	 these	 statistics	
lower	income	households	did	try	anything	in	their	power	to	keep	up	with	their	
mortgage	payments,	 but	 the	 rising	 unemployment	 levels	 prevented	 them	 from	
continuing	their	savings	pattern.	The	inability	to	pay	did	not	stop	at	homeowners	
alone;	renter	households	also	built	up	an	overdue	rent	arrears	debt	of		
	
	
																																																																												
																																																								
5	https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/historical_data/index.html	
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$21.5	 billion	 affecting	 17.3	 million	 households	 out	 of	 a	 total	 of	 44	 million	
according	to	Reuters.6	
	
Having	 shown	 how	 long	 it	 took	 for	 the	 bottom	 50%	 of	 the	 U.S.	 population	 to	
recover,	policy	makers	may	prefer	a	more	effective	instrument.		
	
	
	
3.1	The	How	Question	
	
	
Savings	 can	manifest	 themselves	 in	 different	 forms.	 The	 simple	 one	 is	 cash	 on	
hand.	Other	forms	are	current	accounts,	savings	accounts,	time	deposits,	but	also	
share	 and	bond	holdings	 and	different	 types	 of	 pension	 savings.	Other	 savings	
are	 locked	up	 in	homes	or	 in	 collective	 instruments	 like	pension	 funds.	Finally	
some	 lucky	 households	 may	 have	 an	 art	 collection.	 For	 many	 households	 the	
main	 source	 of	 savings	 is	 in	 a	 home	 and	 in	 their	 pension	 pots.	 It	 is	 not	
recommended	to	use	the	pension	pot	as	a	possible	temporary	liquidity	supplier.		
	
The	easiest	conversion	can	be	to	convert	a	small	share	of	home	equity	into	cash.	
Like	most	things	in	life,	this	is	not	and	cannot	be	a	straightforward	transaction.	
For	one	 thing	no	 system	exists	 yet	 to	 cash	 in	 such	 savings	other	 than	 to	 sell	 a	
property	or	take	a	new	or	additional	mortgage.	Selling	a	home	is	expensive	and	
taking	an	additional	mortgage	turns	the	savings	into	cash	but	with	the	drawback	
that	 debt	 obligations	 are	 created.	 Creating	more	 debt	 for	 the	 simple	 reason	 of	
wanting	to	use	one’s	own	savings	is	an	economically	inefficient	manner.		
	
The	 option	 that	 could	 be	 considered	 is	 to	 use	 Quantitative	 Easing	 from	 the	
Federal	 Reserve.	 This	 will	 be	 a	 different	 type	 of	 Q.E.,	 as	 the	 Fed	 will	 not	 be	
financing	 existing	 debt	 obligations,	 be	 it	 from	 the	 U.S.	 government	 or	 from	
outstanding	 home	 mortgage	 obligations	 from	 the	 state	 sponsored	 mortgage	
lending	 companies	 such	 as	 Fannie	 May	 and	 Freddy	 Mac.	 The	 Fed	 would	 -as	
opposed	 to	 fund	 borrowings-	 fund	 savings	 at	 0%	 costs.	 It	 could	 do	 so	 on	 a	
temporary	basis	by	 converting	part	home	equity	 into	 cash.	 It	 could	make	 such	
funds	 available	 via	 the	 banking	 sector	 to	 individuals	 by	 having	 banks	 create	
households’	 Tessa	 accounts.	 Tessa	 stands	 for	 Temporary	 (equity)	 Spend	 and	
Save	Again	system.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
6	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-housing-evictions-idUSKCN24U394	
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This	could	be	done	using	the	follow	guidelines:	
	
1.	The	request	for	such	conversion	might	have	to	come	from	an	owner-occupier	
in	a	home.	It	is	a	freedom	of	choice	method.	
	
2.	 Such	 request	 can	 also	 come	 from	 homeowners	 who	 rent	 out	 properties.	
However	there	need	to	be	limits	of	such	equity	conversion.	It	is	probably	wise	to	
limit	such	cash	withdrawal	to	less	than	30%	of	the	net	equity	position	in	a	home.		
	
3.	For	homeowners-occupiers	the	request	might	not	be	approved	if	it	lowers	the	
equity	 level	 in	a	home	 to	 less	 than	10%	of	 its	value.	Any	value	above	10%	can	
potentially	be	considered,	but	the	combined	households	collective	requests	have	
to	 fall	 in	 line	with	 the	government’s	assessed	need	 for	economic	 stimulus.	Any	
home	value	assessment	should	be	based	on	February	2020	data.	Any	later	date	
would	 not	 reflect	 normal	 supply	 and	 demand	 levels	 as	 house	 prices	might	 be	
“affected”	by	the	occurrence	of	the	coronavirus;	a	non	economical	influence.		
	
4.	Many	young	persons	and	low-income	earners	face	the	greatest	hardship	as	a	
consequence	of	the	coronavirus.	Parents’	help	should	be	encouraged	as	the	latter	
have	had	the	longest	time	period	to	build	up	their	home	equity	level.	Zero	tax	on	
such	transfers	between	generations	would	be	an	obvious	method.		
	
5.	 The	 person	 or	 family	 withdrawing	 the	 equity	 from	 their	 home	will	 also	 be	
responsible	 for	“re-saving”	the	amount	withdrawn.	A	contract	between	the	Fed	
and	the	individual	household	will	stipulate	such	obligation.		
	
6.	To	enable	households	 to	re-save	 in	 line	with	 the	economic	situation,	a	grace	
period	for	such	re-saving	needs	to	be	set.	The	Federal	Reserve	may	also	decide	to	
make	Q.E.	 funds	 available	 at	 0%	 interest	 rate	 for	 the	homeowner	 as	 the	home	
equity	conversion	is	done	in	the	national	macro-economic	interest.		
	
7.	The	re-saving	needs	to	be	based	on	a	household’s	income	level.	It	is	suggested	
to	set	aside	28%	of	a	household’s	annual	net	income	for	the	purpose	of	re-saving.		
	
8.	 If,	 like	 in	 many	 cases,	 the	 household	 still	 has	 a	 mortgage	 to	 service,	 it	 is	
suggested	that	the	re-saving	gets	priority,	so	as	to	strengthen	the	equity	base	in	
the	home	again.	It	would	imply	that	mortgage	lenders	(about	50%	are	funded	by	
state	 sponsored	 enterprises	 anyway)	 could	 be	 temporarily	 paid	 the	 interest	
margin	on	 the	mortgage	 loan	only.	The	principal	 amount	of	 re-saving	 could	be	
executed	on	basis	of	income	levels.		
	
9. Linking	the	re-saving	level	with	the	income	level	will	imply	that	the	re-saving	
will	be	done	at	 a	 slower	pace,	when	 the	economy	 is	 still	 in	a	 recession	period.	
Only	 when	 the	 U.S	 economy	 is	 booming	 again,	 will	 the	 speed	 of	 re-saving	 be	
accelerated	until	the	full	amount	of	home	equity	that	was	provided	has	been		
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replaced.	At	 that	moment	 the	outstanding	mortgage	 facility	 is	 reinstated	 to	 the	
agreed	interest	plus	principal	payment	facility.		
	
10.	The	U.S.	government	might	need	to	decide	about	the	eligibility	of	households	
to	participate	in	the	Tessa	System.	Should	the	maximum	income	level	eligible	for	
the	Tessa	system	be	set	at	 the	median	 income	 level	of	$65,000	or	at	 twice	 this	
amount	at	$130,000?	Should	there	be	regional	variations?	
	
11.The	 U.S.	 government	 may	 also	 need	 to	 decide	 to	 what	 extent	 it	 wants	 the	
Tessa	 System	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 U.S.	 economy;	 in	 other	 words	 how	 large	 a	
share	of	home	equity	is	required	to	help	improve	the	current	situation.	If	enough	
money	is	converted	into	demand	levels,	the	facility	may	be	closed	to	newcomers	
until	a	new	economic	crisis	occurs.	
	
12.	 The	 Tessa	 system	 allows	 the	 U.S.	 government	 to	 turn	 the	 tap	 off	 when	
releasing	 home	 equity	 is	 no	 longer	 needed	 and	 turn	 the	 tap	 back	 on	 when	 it	
judges	the	economic	circumstances	require	it	to	do	so.	
	
13.	 The	 Tessa	 account	 could	 be	 an	 account	 to	 be	 setup	 by	 the	 household’s	
principal	bank	on	the	request	of	the	homeowner.	The	costs	of	maintaining	such	
accounts	 –over	 which	 the	 banking	 system	 does	 not	 run	 a	 credit	 risk	 only	 an	
operational	one-	could	be	at	the	costs	of	the	Government	as	the	scheme	is	in	the	
macroeconomic	national	interest.	
	
14.The	 Tessa	 account	 might	 be	 abused	 by	 some	 homeowners.	 Therefore	 if	 a	
homeowner	does	not	fulfil	its	contractual	obligations	in	“re-saving”	the	principal	
amount	when	 due,	 he	 or	 she	may	 be	 penalized	 by	 turning	 the	 facility	 into	 an	
ordinary	mortgage	with	penalty	interest	rates.	
	
15.	In	line	with	previous	arrangements,	the	Government	could	give	a	guarantee	
to	the	Fed	for	potential	 losses	made	on	the	scheme	for	10%	of	 the	outstanding	
amount.		
	
	
	
4.	Some	conclusions	
	
The	 key	 conclusion	 from	 the	 above	 is	 that	 a	 different	 economic	 adjustment	
method	 can	be	used	 to	 stimulate	 economic	 growth	and	employment	 levels.	All	
U.S.	households	suffered	huge	home	equity	losses	since	2007,	but	especially	the	
lower	 income	group	of	50%	of	 all	 these	households.	The	 latter	 group	came	off	
worst.	Their	home	equity	loss	and	the	recovery	back	to	the	starting	point	of	the	
cycle	lasted	11	years.		
	
This	recovery	period	could	have	been	much	shorter	for	all	households,	but	such	
method	would	have	been	especially	beneficial	for	the	lower	income	groups.	To		
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continue	to	make	home	equity	savings	is	difficult	enough	for	these	groups.	To	see	
their	savings	evaporate	altogether	is	an	economic	systems	failure.	There	was	and	
is	no	need	for	such	losses	if	Q.E.	would	have	been	directed	in	a	different	manner.	
	
The	combined	U.S.	 financial	 institutions	cannot	undertake	such	task.	They	need	
to	 reward	 their	 own	 savers,	 who	 have	 put	 their	 surplus	 cash	 on	 deposit	 with	
them.	Therefore	any	additional	funds	provided	to	households	can	only	be	in	the	
form	of	a	loan	with	interest	added	to	it.	
	
What	 households	 needed	 in	 2007,	 especially	 the	 lower	 income	 groups,	 was	 a	
temporary	access	to	their	savings	levels.	Just	because	such	savings	were	tied	up	
in	a	home,	they	still	represented	actual	savings	made.	
	
The	only	U.S.	institution	capable	of	delivering	such	temporary	access	to	savings	
was	and	is	the	Federal	Reserve.	It	can	fund	such	savings	at	no	cost	to	them	and	
thereby	 no	 costs	 to	 the	 households.	 Recessions	 are	 periods	when	 demand	 for	
goods	 and	 services	 decline	 and	 unemployment	 levels	 increase.	 In	 2007	 the	
decline	set	in	and	had	this	method	been	available	then,	the	demand	levels	would	
have	been	stimulated	by	temporarily	using	existing	savings	levels.	
	
It	was	not	considered	then,	but	also	not	yet	now.	However	the	benefits	to	the	U.S.	
economy	 are	 clear.	 Increased	 consumption	 will	 lead	 to	 higher	 employment	
levels.	Higher	employment	 levels	will	 lead	to	higher	company	profits	and	more	
investments.	 It	 will	 also	 lead	 to	 a	 higher	 tax	 income	 level	 and	 lower	 U.S.	
government	 deficits,	 without	 having	 to	 change	 the	 tax	 rates.	 Banks	 will	 see	 a	
reduced	level	of	doubtful	debtors.	This	system	will	also	protect	the	accumulated	
savings	made	in	the	past	in	an	economically	more	efficient	manner.	
	
Perhaps	the	time	has	come	to	consider	such	a	system	for	the	benefit	of	all.	
	
	
	
	
Kees	De	Koning	
	
Chorleywood	U.K.	
	
22nd	November	2020	
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